By Pishtaz | 2025-03-04

As a series of setbacks cripples the so-called "axis of resistance," the leadership of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) commander Esmail Qaani has come under fire.

It is on Qaani's watch that Hassan Nasrallah -- the powerful commander of Lebanese Hizbullah, the Iranian regime's main proxy -- was killed September 27.

Nasrallah's named successor, Hashem Safieddine, was killed as well, after numerous other top-tier party leaders lost their lives in the "pager attacks" that targeted their pagers and two-way radios (walkie-talkies).

These attacks showed Hizbullah had been fully penetrated, leaving it exposed and weakened, with a visibly shaken Naim Qassem forced to take the helm.

The fall of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad the following month further weakened the IRGC-QF, which lost a safe base of operations for its Syria proxies.

Some blamed al-Assad's fall on Qaani and the IRGC, Iran International reported in January.

Since the fall of the Syrian regime, there have been rumblings inside the IRGC, Khabar online reported.

Some are saying, "What kind of Quds Force is this, and Qaani is incapable," Ali Shirazi, a former representative of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, told Khabar.

Weak or complicit?

Questions also have emerged about Qaani's role in Hamas's October 7 attack.

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar negotiated with the Iranian regime for $500 million in funding as early as 2021, with Tehran already providing $10 million for Hamas's armed wing, the Wall Street Journal reported.

By 2016, Hamas had expanded its fighting force to 27,000, adding 6,000 fighters in just two years, while acquiring sophisticated weapons, GPS jammers and drones, an intelligence memo reviewed by the New York Times showed.

The same memo projected Hamas aimed to expand to 40,000 fighters by 2020.

While Tehran's United Nations mission claims Hamas acted independently, evidence suggests either IRGC-QF complicity in the October 7 attack or loss of control over its proxy force, regional experts told Pishtaz.

In any event, by late 2024, Qaani's control over the IRGC-QF's proxy network showed signs of collapse, and by early 2025, he was facing significant challenges, with voices within the establishment demanding a leadership change.

As the Iranian regime grapples with the most serious challenges to its regional influence in decades, the fate of the IRGC-QF commander now hangs in the balance.