By Pishtaz | 2026-03-25

The structure of the Islamic Republic's armed forces has long been debated among analysts and observers studying the country's security institutions.

Without the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), resources could flow directly to the regular army, known as the Artesh, enabling meaningful modernization.

However, the coexistence of these parallel institutions has produced persistent financial, operational and structural tensions throughout the Islamic Republic's broader military system.

Funding disparities illustrate one of the clearest differences between the two forces and highlight enduring imbalances within Iran's defense priorities.

Despite the Artesh serving as the larger conventional military responsible for defending Iran's borders, the IRGC consistently receives a significantly larger share of funding.

In Iran's 2020 defense budget, the IRGC reportedly received roughly $6.96 billion, while the Artesh received approximately $2.73 billion.

Competition and rivalry

Without the IRGC operating as a parallel institution, financial resources could, in theory, be redirected to strengthen and modernize the conventional army.

Much of the Artesh's existing equipment still consists of older Western and Soviet-era platforms that have undergone limited modernization over the decades.

This dual structure also creates overlapping responsibilities that sometimes produce competition and friction between the two institutions.

Eliminating the IRGC as a separate military force could create a unified command structure under a single operational chain of command.

Such a system could allow resources, intelligence and planning to flow more efficiently across the country's entire defense establishment.

Greater institutional integration could have also reduced the rivalry that occasionally complicates coordination between the two forces.

Public perception

The IRGC concentrates heavily on asymmetric warfare, missile programs, regional proxy networks and unconventional operations abroad.

Without the IRGC, Iran's armed forces could shift more clearly toward a conventional defense posture common among most national militaries.

The regular army could also prioritize deterrence, border security and protection of critical infrastructure across Iranian territory.

Another important difference between the two institutions involves their relationship with Iran's civilian population and domestic political system.

The IRGC and its affiliated paramilitary units have played a central role in suppressing protests and enforcing political control inside Iran.

The Artesh, by contrast, generally avoids involvement in domestic repression and concentrates primarily on external defense responsibilities.

Because the regular army has no role in morality policing, it has historically maintained a somewhat more neutral public image.

This perception has contributed to higher public trust in the Artesh than in the IRGC.